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Fuels for Future Electric Power 

By OLIVER S. YU 
T H E dominant energy sources in the United States to­day are based on hydrocarbons- crude oil, natural 
gas, and their derivatives. These fuels are obtained from 
limited resources that are being dep leted at an increas­
ing rate, .and will likely be exhausted within forty years. 
Furthermore, the U. S. is dependent on foreign im­
ports for more than a third of these fuels. Experience has 
clearly shown that this dependence on energy imports, 
particularly from politically uncertain regions such as 
Africa and the Middle East, can and will damage ou r 
national economy and endanger our national security. 
To preserve its political and economic well-being, the 
nation must protect itself from the possibility of having 
its energy supplies interrupted. 
Thus, it is not only imperative but also widely ac­
cepted that the United States must develop a s trategy for 
energy independence to relieve its heavy reliance upon 
the world's limited supplies of oil and gas by moving 
within the next several decades toward a system that is 
supplied by other forms of energy. From a geopolitical 
point of view, such a strategy will help stabilize world 
trade in the presence of a vigorous and cohesive 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries oil 
cartel, as well as allow the U.S. to maintain its freedom 
of action on the international scene. 
Oliver S. Yu is a project manager 
on the technical assessment staff at 
the Electric Power Research In­
stitute, which he joined in 1974 
(energy systems modeling 
program). He is a council member 
of the energy systems group of the 
Operations Research Society of 
America and a consultant on 
systems analysis for Stanford 
Research Institute. Dr. Yu received 
a BSEE degree from Taiwan Univer­
sity and an MS degree in electrical 
engineering from Georgia Institute 
of Technology. From Stanford 
University he holds an MS degree in 
statistics and a PhD degree in 
operations resea~ch. 
To achieve this trans1t10n toward energy in­
dependence the United States is fortunate in having a 
number of technicaJ options, but it has relatively few 
choices. The options consist of adopting more stringent 
and effective energy-conserving practices; stimulating. 
Economists and engineers at the Electric Power 
Research Institute have devised and used a program­
ming model to explore some ofthe options by which the 
United States may realistically move away from its 
present heavy dependence on oil and gas to a mpre 
diversified energy economy. One aim oftheir model was 
to allow for price-induced interfuel substitution and 
price-induced energy conservation. The findings of the 
study are summarized here. In particular, the author 
reports that the present value of benefits from both tht 
fast-breeder reactor and coal-based synthetic fuels well 
exceeds their anticipated research and development 
costs. The direct cost to the United States economy from 
a nuclear moratorium is also calculated. 
increased production of domestic oil and gas; transfer· 
fing a greater portion of the energy demand to the mort 
abundant coal and nuclear supplies; and learning to ex· 
ploit such underused resources as geothermal power and 
waste heat, and such inexhaustible energy sources as 
solar radiation and fusion. None of these options by itself 
can make a large enough contribution during the neXl 
two decades to a void increasing U. S. dependence on im· 
ports. The nation, therefore, has the limited choice ri 
determining an appropriate combination of existing op· 
tions. 
Unfortunately, none of the options is free from objec· 
tions. For example, conservation ofenergy and reduction 
ofwaste in energy use are attractive concepts in principle 
until one examines in detail the social, technical. 
economic, and legal obstacles that abound. Then we fllld 
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Figure 1 Electric energy costs 
a polarization of views and much room for d isagreement 
in the political arena. Expanding domestic production of 
energy by any of several means involves its own ob­
stacles, licensing delays, and undesirable environmental 
consequences. Meanwhile, the hope that solar- or 
fusion-produced electricity will be free of many of the ob­
jections to coal-fired plants or nuclear reactors must 
await the outcome of developments that can provide 
more definitive information about the attractiveness and 
acceptability of those advanced concepts. 
To overcome present difficulties, the United States 
will need a diversified research and development 
program, but its investment in plants and equipment 
will have to be concentrated on two major options that 
are realistically available within the next twenty to forty 
years: (1) expanding the supplies of energy provided by 
nuclear fission and coal, and (2) curtailing the growth of 
the demand for oil and gas, partly through conservation 
and partly through substitution of coal- and nuclear­
fueled electricity and synthetic fuels ·in their place Pur­
poseful planning will be necessary to achieve a measure 
of energy independence. And we may have to take some 
environmental risks in developing our domestic 
petroleum, gas, and oil shale resources over the next 
decades. 
Beginning in the 1990's the United States must 
de~-elop a synthetic fuels industry- initially coal-based 
fuels such as methane and methanol, then hydrogen 
derived from nuclear fission , and eventually perhaps 
hydrogen from fusion or solar, or both. In evaluating 
these options, timing is crucial. The fast -breeder reactor 
(FBR) is needed as insurance againist high-cost 
uranium and coal during a per iod of transition away 
from an energy economy based upon oil and gas and 
10ward one with a potentia lly infinite resource base. 
Either solar or fusion, or the FBR, itself, could eliminate 
United States dependence upon scarce natural resources 
for energy production in future years. 
Recently at the Electric Power Research Institute, my 
colleagues Peter Auer, a Cornell University physicist, 
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and Alan Manne, a H arvard political economist, and 
m yself conducted a study to examine the implications of 
these realistic pathways to energy independence. The 
prospective benefits of new technologies, particularly the 
fast -breeder reactor and synthetic fuels, were then as­
sessed within this framework. Highlights of the results of 
the stu dy a re summarized here . 
Principal Assumptions 
The study uses an economic resource allocation 
model. The model is formulated as though all decision 
makers had a common objective: to meet the projected 
energy demand at minimum discounted costs for capital 
investment, fuel, operation, and maintenance over a 75­
year planning period. All costs and b enefits are ex­
pressed in terms of " real" 1975 dollars. Thus , any price 
rises due to general inflation would not affect the 
analysis. 
In this analysis, we were concerned primarily with 
two secondary forms of energy - electric and non­
electric (e.g., liquids and gases). Coal can supply both 
the electric and nonelectric sectors either by direct com­
bustion or by conversion to synthetic fuels. Nuclear fue ls 
may be used ~o generate electricity and also to produce 
hydrogen by electrolysis to supply the needs of the non­
electric sector. Consequently, there are paths in our 
mode l by which either coal or nuclear fuels can meet all 
energy demands, with the proportions of their contribu-· 
tions being determined by the relative costs of interfuel 
substitution. 
It should be emphasized that the model used in this 
analysis is not a forecasting model, but rather a planning 
model by which the consequences of alternative future 
energy.-economic sce narios can be examined. For exam­
ple, desp ite the fact that recent domestic political 
developments have not brought the United States close 
to the goals of energy independence , it is a fundamental 
assumption of the model that the nation will strive 
toward these goals by limiting its future energy imports 
to a certain level. 
It also should be pointed out that the study is par­
ticularly interested in assessing the economic viability of 
two major near-term energy technologies: coal-based 
synthetic fuels and the fast-breeder reactor. For this 
reason, the developments of many other technological 
options, such as oil shale and the high-temperature gas­
cooled reactor, are deliberately assumed to occur at their 
potential upper limits rather than at more achievable 
lower levels. 
Discount Rates 
The costs of developing new technologies are incurred 
in the near term, but their benefits require a long time to 
accrue. Therefore, in order to compare costs and 
benefits, it becomes necessary to discount both to their 
present values. This is sound economic practice and 
provides u seful planning information when the time 
span of concern is brief. The practice of discounting , 
however, weighs heavily against benefits when they are 
expected to accrue over extended periods. Thus, for ex­
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Figure 2 Noncle<:lric energy costs 
ample, the value of today's dolla r twenty-five years 
hence is on ly nine cents, if we use a 10 per cent a nnual 
discount rate. 
What discount rate, then , is appropriate for measur­
ing the costs and benefits of long-range projects? The 
present practice of the U .S. Office of Management and 
Budget is to use 10 per cent as the discount factor in 
federally sponsored energy research and development 
project s. But this rate seem s far higher than the real 
returns to investors in the private sector of the economy. 
For example, H arvard economists L. R. Christensen and 
D. W .J orgenson estimate that the real rate ofcompensa­
tion to property owners was 3 to 5 per cent in the years 
1929-69, once allowance was mad e for the effects of infla­
tion on both incomes and wealth . This would imply that , 
for example, a 10 per cent nominal discount rate would 
be consistent with a 4 per cent ra te in real te rms, coupled 
with a 6 per cent inflationary factor . Since the discount 
rate s ignificantly affects the selection of future energy 
supply mix, we have used two and sometimes three alter­
native discount rates (5 per cent, 7.5 per cent, and 10 per 
cent, expressed in terms of "constant" dollars) in o rder 
to study the sensi tivity of this important factor . 
Demarui 
In the analysis, the energy demand projections a re not 
extrapolations of historical trends but are derived in­
stead from an economic model that incorporates the ef­
fects of aggregate national income growth and energy 
supply price changes. For the latter effects, through the 
use of own-price and cross-price elasticities, a higher 
price of one energy source would induce conserva tion of 
that source and prompt its substitution by another. 
Using this model, projections of the demand growth 
for electric energy could be on the low side because 
historically, with consumers' preference for electricity 
over other forms of energy, new technological applica­
tions of electricity have stimulated increased demand. 
However, demand projections calculated for cases 
studied in the analysis have all fallen well within the 
30 
bounds of historical extrapolations and the forecasts of 
other major studies, such as the Ford Foundation 
Energy Po licy Project. 
Ruourct Bnse 
The availability and cost of petroleum, natural gas, 
and thei r derivatives {designated here collectively as 
PETG) will h ave profound effects on the benefits of com. 
peting energy sources. We assume, for planning pur­
poses, that a realistic base figure for the ultimately 
producible PETG resources in the United States is two 
quintillion Btu (= 2 X 1018 Btu), corresponding approx­
ima tely to a 40-year lifetime supply a t currml domestic 
consumption ra tes. T his estimate falls well within the 
confidence range of recent official estimates. In order to 
test sen sitivity, we also treat the more optimistic case 
that the ultimate domes tic PETG reserves will turn out 
to be three quintillion Btu (3Q). In order to simulate a 
policy aimed at energy independence, import levels are 
he ld cons ttl nt at 7 million barrels per d ay (oil 
equi va lent) even though realistically we recognize 
that they are likely to be more than this in the near term. 
As long as resources a re available , it is assumed that 
PETG costs will remain constant at the 1975 oil impon 
price of S2 per million Btu. This is more than actual 
1975 domestic prices, averaged over the mix of new and 
old oil, regulated and unregulated gas. However, it 
represents a plausible assumption , unless one is inclined 
to believe that OPEC will soon collapse and world oil 
prices will plunge. 
The magnitude of the ultimately producible domestic 
coal reserves is not at issue because of the limited time 
span of our planning horizon (only seventy-five years). 
What is of some concern, however, is the future rate of 
coa l utilization. The rises in the price of coal since 1973 
are not assumed to be significant in determining long· 
term benefits, but we are largely ignorant of what shape 
the coa l supply curve would take under conditions where 
annual coal production would have to increase ad in· 
finitum. Consequently, we have assumed two simple 
alternative cases: one in which coal costs remain con· 
stant at the current va lue of $1 per million Btu, 
independent of production volumes; and one in which 
the unit costs remai n constant until annual production 
reaches twice the current level and thereafter rise linear· 
ly with the amount produced. Thus, coal costs would 
reach S2 per million Btu when annual production had 
b ecome four times the present level and $3 per million 
Btu at six times the current production volume. (These 
cost increases could arise from a variety of factors; for ex· 
ample, the need for more stringent environmental con· 
trois in the presence of a greater density of coal-burning 
plants.) It should not be surprising that the relative 
benefits of coal and nuclear technologies are quite sen· 
sitive to whether coal costs remain level o r rise with in· 
creasing use. This ques tion should be given far more 
careful sc rutiny t han in the past. 
It is we ll-known that the projected benefits of ad· 
vanced nuclear technologies, whether plutonium rec~c_le. 
high-conversion reactors or breeders, are quite sensttJVr 
PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY-JUNE 3, 197
to 
gi• 
ti: 
of 
p~ 
oO 
De 
br 
ca 
th 
av 
on 
he 
tc 
70 
r, 
d~ 
to 
pr 
bi 
sh 
0( 
Ill 
lir 
di 
sh 
tk 
co 
Pt 
6 
-------------------------------------,,----------y--------------~r--. 1500 
90 
80 
70 >... 
c
., 
·u 
60 ~ w 
?f. 
50 
<:t (') 
40 
~ 
.>< 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Hydro, Etc. 
1985 
~ 
1000 ~ 
~ 
·~ 
..
Q. 
... 
;:
... 
0. 
?f. 
,.._ "' 
..!! 
.,500 
3: 
<!l 
0 
1970 2000 2015 2030 
Figure 3 Electric energy demand and production through the year 2030 
e 
.6 
to the assumed quantities of uranium fuel available at a 
given price. We do not pretend to add any new informa­
tion to the often-debated question ofhow much uranium 
of a given richness remains to be discovered and ex­
ploited within the United States. Instead, we rely on the 
official estimates given by the Energy Research and 
Development Administration in its most recent report on 
breeder benefits. From this we have extracted a base 
case and a "pessimistic" supply curve. The two diO.er in 
that the former predicts 5 million short tons of U30 8 
available at $100 per pound, while the latter predicts 
only 3 million short tons at that cost. One should note, 
however, that official figures for identified reserves of 
economically recoverable U30 8 are currently quoted at 
700,000 short tons. 
Technological Options 
As PETG supplies for the nonelectric energy sector 
dwindle, they will be replaced by oil shale, synthetic gas­
eous and liquid fuels from coal (SYNF), or hydrogen 
produced by electrolysis (ELHY). It can be argued that 
biomass derived from solar energy is another source that 
should be included in this category, although we have 
not done so explicitly. 
The development of shale oil products by existing 
mining and surface-retorting technology is apt to be 
limited by the availability of water and the problems of 
disposing of spent shale waste. We have allowed for 
shale's initial commercial appearance in 1985, a produc­
tion of one million barrels per day (oe) by 1990, and a 
constant increase of production by one million barrels 
per day (oe) in each five-year period thereafter. 
sYNF production could begin to grow significantly in 
the early 1990's. We assume it to be available at a cost of 
$3 per million Btu, with a conversion efficiency of6 7 per 
cent and a coal cost of $1 per million Btu. Under base 
case assumptions, we project the combined output from 
.__...,.UNE 3 . 197f\-PIIRI Jr. I ITII ITI~S E:OBT NIGI:II "'
shale and SYNF to be eight million barrels per day (oe) 
by the year 2000, almost equal to the 1975 levels of 
domestic crude oil production. 
ELHY is assumed to be available at about $5 per mil­
lion Btu, assuming that electrolyzers will achieve I00 per 
cent efficiency and that on an equivalent-energy basis 
the value of hydrogen is no different from that of any 
other fuel. With these assumptions, ELHY does not 
become economically competitive with SYNF until coal 
costs rise above $2 per million Btu, or unless the cost of 
nuclear base-load electricity is decreased by future 
developments. Eventually, thermochemical processes 
may lead to reduced costs for hydrogen production. We 
do not allow for this explicitly in our calculations, 
however, because of the uncertain state of this 
technology. 
We combine the production of electricity from 
geothermal sources and from wind and waste products, 
together with hydroelectric generation, and refer to them 
all as hydro. I n 1970 this category accounted for 16 per 
cent of the electricity genera ted . It is assumed that the 
hydro component will grow steadily at 2 per cent an­
nually. 
Fossi l-fired plants will continue to produce electricity 
in the future for at least two reasons. As of 1970, about 
45 per cent of these plants used oil or gas. Even if no ad­
ditional PETG-consuming plants has been built after 
1970, those in service would continue to operate through 
their useful lifetimes , thus requiring a significant amoum 
of PETG input to the electric sector until the end of the 
century. Coa l-fired plants are expected to provide a 
minimum of 40 per cent of all new electric energy sup ­
plies until the year 2000, in order to accommodate cy: 
cling and peak-load requirements. After 2000, it is as­
sumed that these requirements can be reduced linearly 
to zero in twenty years. By 2020, for example, low-cost 
swrage technologies a re likely to become available. This 
would then make it economical for nuclear plants to 
:-------------------------­ 31 
meet the cycling and peak loads of a system, in addition 
to the base loads. 
Light-water reactors (LWR 's) appear at present to 
be, on a n<H ional average. the lowest cost plants for base­
load generation. Operations with and without 
plutonium recycle are included in our model. Our 
calculations indicate that stockpiling plutonium for 
future breeders is the economically advantageous choice, 
providing the FBR becomes available by the year 2000 
and its breeding gain is limited to the low value assumed 
here. The model also allows for a variation in the tails as­
say at which future enrichment plants will operate. We 
generally find it preferable to aim for a 0.2 per cent 
rather than 0.3 per cent tails assay as uranium ore costs 
increase. 
The high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) 
has been introduced into some of these calculations in 
order to test the sensitivity of breeder benefits to the ex­
istence of a high-performance converter. Thus, 
somewhat unrealistically, we assume HTGR capital 
costs to be equal to those of the L WR and fuel cycle costs 
to be only somewha t higher for HTGR than for the 
LWR with plutonium recycle. We also as ume the 
HTGR can appear in substantial numbers commercially 
by 1990, a full ten years before the FBR, although at the 
moment it still lacks sufficient industrial backing. The 
high-temperature advantages of the HTGR for process 
heat generation or thermochemical hydrogen production 
are not specifically taken into account. Only its potential 
advantage in conserving expensive uranium is included 
in our analysis. 
The FB R assumptions here are decidedly conser­
vative. W e postulate that indecision will continue to slow 
down the U.S. program and that no significant commer­
cial introduction of the FBR will occur before 1995; that 
FBR's will constitute no more than 20 per cent of the 
new plants installed and operating in the year 2000 and 
no more 1han 40 per cent of the new plants installed in 
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2005; and that the number of FBR 's installed will be un. \ 
limited beyond 2005. Capital costs of the FBR are as­
sumed to be S l 00 per kilowatt-electric higher than those 
of the LWR, implying that in order for the FBR to be 
competitive with the LWR it will be necessary for 
uran ium costs to exceed S30 per pound. We assume a 
net breeding gain of 4 per cem (corresponding to a sim­
ple doubling time of twenty-five years). Any improve­
ments in FBR performance or reductions in capital cost 
are ascribed to advanced technology (AOV, defined 
below). The small breeding gain limits the rate or 
breeder introduction, thus making plutonium quite 
valuable. We find that its incremental value rises from 
S10 per gram in 1985 to $45 per gram in the year 2000. 
In order to allow for potential major technological 
breakthroughs, we have included an advanced 
technology (ADV) category in our model. This may be 
solar, fusion, improved breeders, or yet some other ad­
vanced technology. Its cost is assumed to be appreciably 
less than the FBR used in the model. The only con­
straint we place on the ADV is that it appear commer­
cially no sooner than twenty years after the FBR. 
Cost est imates for these technology options are sum­ c 
f
marized in Figures I and 2 (pages 29 and 30). 
l 
An Example of Transition, Using 
Base Case Results 
The shift from the present PET G-dominated energy 
n 
economy to one dependent on nuclear or coal, or both, 
may occur along various paths. For purposes of illustra­
tion, we present one mode of transition, obtained from 
the base case calculations. In this case, the uranium sup­
ply curve has its nominal value, coal costs are assumed gto rise with increasing use, and the nuclear reactor mix 
consists only of LWR 's and FBR's. Figure 3 (page 31) 
indicates the gradual transition in electricity generation 
from fossil fuels to LWR to FBR to ADV, along with a 
40 
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Figure 4 Nonelectric energy demand and production through the year 2030 
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relatively small but steady contribution from hydro 
between 1970 and 2030. The units of measure are 
quadrillions of Btu, or quads (I quad =one-thousandth 
1015of a Q = Btu). This can also be expressed as 
gigawatts-electric of base-load capacity equivalent, at a 
75 per cent capacity factor, or in kilowatt-hours of 
electricity generated at a given (34 per cent) conversion 
efficiency. Figure 4 (page 32) shows the corresponding 
shifts in the nonelectric sector, from PETG to shale and 
SYNF and then to ELHY. The area under the domestic 
PETG curve corresponds to the two-quad resource base. 
The units of measure are quads or million barrels per 
day (oe). Note that the shaded area represents the re­
quirements for old oil- and gas-fired generating units. 
Figures 3 and 4 may be literally interpreted as show­
ing a gradual shift to a " hydrogen economy." Alter­
natively, one could interpret them as indicating a rapid 
shift toward an "all-electric economy.'' Needless to say, 
the transi tion indicated is sensitive to the comparative 
costs of nuclear-generated and coal-generated 
electricity. Electricity demand would change from the 
base case if the FBR were delayed indefinitely and coal 
costs remained constant. Such an extreme departure 
from the base case would have major consequences. 
Under those conditions, coal consumption in 2015 would 
rise dramatically from 75 quads (under base case as­
sumptions) to 180 quads if coal costs remained constant 
and the FBR were absent. 
By presenting the base case resu lts in some detail , it is 
not our intent to argue that a firm commitment is war­
ranted at this time to an all-electric or an all-hydrogen 
economy. Rather, it is ro underscore the fact that in the 
foreseeable future a much greater reliance on both coa l 
and nuclear energy will be required to sustain the 
general economy. 
Finally, we wish to observe that the risi ng energy 
prices given by the base case calculations lead to energy 
demand growth rates significantly lower than those of 
the past. This is shown in Figure 5 (page 33 ), where for 
the sake of comparison we have included points obtained 
by the Ford Foundation Energy Policy P roject. 
Interestingly enough, our model suggests that the uncer­
tainty of knowing whether our ultimate domestic PETG 
reserves will be two quads or three quads has little effect 
upon demand projections until shortly before the ye;~r 
2000. Presumably, in the interval, continued effort in ex­
ploration and production will indicate more reliably 
which of these two assumptions lies closer to the truth . 
In the absence of relief from rising real energy prices, w<:: 
expect strong market responses in the direct ion or energy 
conservation. Technological advances that promise 
energy savings (such as solar-assisted heating and cool­
ing, and improved auto efficiencies) are likely to be 
adopted by the public if energy prices continue to rise. 
Benefits of Future T echnologies 
We are concerned principally with two future 
technologies: SYNF, dependent on coal, and FBR , 
which essentially decouples the dependence of the 
nuclear option from the availability of uranium. In the 
table (page 34) on "Benefits of New Technologies" we 
show the interdependence between the economic 
benefits of these two technologies. The two center 
columns of figures in the table refer to the base c;~se 
results, where we assume that two quads PETG are 
available and that coal costs rise with utilization. In th e 
absence or the FBR , economywide energy costs would 
rise by $26 billion at a 10 per cent annual discount rate 
and by $435 billion at a 5 percent annual discount r<~tc. 
Including the FBR but excluding SYNF would result in 
a cost penalty of $8 billion at a I 0 per cent annual dis­
count rate. The two technologies, however, are partial 
substitutes for each other. Th<ll is, total costs would in­
crease by $47 billion if neither were ava ilable during the 
time horizon of our analysis and the annual discount 
rate were I 0 per cent. 
Numbers in the two lerthand columns illustrate the 
extreme case, in which coal costs remain constant, in­
dependent of utilization rates. As expected, SYNF 
benefits in that case rise dramatically, while FBR 
benefits drop. Once more, the joint benefit of both 
technologies together exceeds the sum of the individual 
contributions. On the other hand, the benefits of YNF 
are damped significantly if three quads PETG are as­
sumed. (See the two righthand columns of the table.) In 
that case, the introduction of high-cost SY NF 
technology could be delayed by another dec;~dc after 
1990. The basic mess;~ge of these figures is that, in the 
absence of reliable knowledge or u ltimate oil and gas 
reserves, of ultimate uranium reserves, and the cost or 
coal with increased use, both SYN F and FBR 
technologies represent valuable forms of insurance 
a~ainst future energy shortages. 
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BENEFITS OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ($ BILLIONS}a 
Constant b 
Coal Costs 
Rising 
cCoal Costs 
Total Amount of Oil and 
Gas Available Domestically 2Qd 2Qd 3Qe 
Annual discount rate 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 
FBR benefits 
SYNF benefits 
FBR + SYNF (combined} 
benefits 
4 123 
103 176 
127 587 
26 
8 
47 
435 
0 
449 
15 
3 
22 
270 
0 
277 
' 
' 
:r 
a. 	 Present values of the differences in economywide energy costs, with and 
without the specified technology, excluding R&D costs , discounted to 
1975. 
b. 	 Coal costs remain $1/MM Btu, regardless of the amount consumed. 
c . 	 Coal costs remain constant at $1/MM Btu up to an annual consumption rate 
of 25 quads (twice the 1970 level} . Thereafter , they rise linearly to $2 
at 50 quads, $3 at 75 quads and so on. This is the base case assumptipn. 
18d. 	 Q ~ lo stu. 2Q is equivalent to 45 years of suppl y at 1970 rate of 

production. 

e . 	 3Q is equivalent to 68 year s of supply at 1970 rate of production. 
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Economic Costs of a Nuclear 

Moratoriu m 

The model used for these benefit-cost analyses can 
also be applied to quantify the economic costs of a 
nationwide nuclear moratorium. T his is done by 
Ct~lculating the difference between the economy" ide 
costs of meeting energy demands with and without 
nuclear power . We define a m or(ltorium as a situ(ltion in 
which the total installed capaciry of L\\R 's in the 
United tates is lim ited to ;)0 gigawatts-electric, a level 
th;H will be reached before 1980. 
To offset a nuclear moratorium, it would not be 
realistic to rely upon the advanced technologies (solar or 
fusion or both) until the 21st ce ntury. Moreover, it 
would not be politically pn1dent to rely upon fu rther in­
creases in our imports ofoil and gas. For the next twent y 
to forty years, this leaves us with just two alternatives to 
nuclea r energy: (1) heavy reliance upon coal for the 
production of both electricity and synthetic fuels, and 
(2) conservation, induced by sharp rises in energy prices. 
Both routes a re expensive. 
T he mode l a utomatically selects a minimal-cost mm­
binalzon oft hose energy supply and conservtltion options 
that a re assumed to be available. In the base case. for ex. 
amp le, it woul d b e optimal for coal consumption to rise 
far more r(lpidly than it has in the past- qundrupling 
from I 970 to 2000. In the cvem of a nuclear moratorium, 
coal consumption would ha\·e to rise sixfold over this 
period, to reach 75 quads by the year 2000. II is hi~hh 
doubtful that this could be accomplished in an en·­
vironmentally and economically sound fashion. 
Conservt~tion cou ld reduce energy demands, but it too 
ht~s a cost- one that can be inferred indirectly from th~ 
price consumers are willing to pay for energy rather than 
do without it. For example, as shown in Figure 6 (pa~~ 
35 ), with nuclear energy available (the base case as­
sumption ), in the year 2000 the price ofelectricity would 
be $24 per I 03 kilowatt-hours a nd the quantity 
demanded would be 6.6 trillion kilowatt-hours. With a 
mora torium, the cost of electricity would rise to $38 per 
1()3 kilowatt -hours. This price rise would induce conser­
vation, and dem<~nd would be expected to drop by 19 
per cent. 
For the year 2000, the costs of a nuclea r moratorium 
- the loss in "consumers' surplus," due to higher 
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ANNUAL COAL CONSUMPTION ELECTRICITY PRICES 
Figure 6 Project ed consequences of a nuclear moratorium in year 2000 
electric ity prices - would b e a pproximately $80 billion. Two addi tiona l remarks s hould be made. Firs t, s ince 
Disco unting and summing over a ll fu ture years, the tota l our mo de l assumes a g iven ra te of income growth. th e 
costs would a mount to more tha n $300 billion a t a 10 per damping effect of rising energy prices on the genera l 
cent annua l discount rate and $2,500 billion at a 5 pe r eco nomy is not considered . If it were, the overa ll 
cent annua l discou nt rate. This is our best est imate of economic cost of a morator ium could b e st ilt higher. Sec­
the cost of shifting to a predominantly coal-based and ond , one sho uld a lso compare ou r numbers with es­
oonserva t ion-orie nted economy. Nearly ha lf of these tima tes that have been made of poss ible damages 
costs would be reflected in each month's residentia I resulting from a catastrophic accidem fo llowing a core 
electric ity bills. The rema inder would be paid in th e meltdown. In t his ma nner, one could then begin to com­
form of higher prices for a ll goods and services tha t con­ pa re the costs a nd benefit s of a na tiona l nuclear 
sume e lectricity. mora torium. 
The Past as Prologue 
For some time now, Washington bureaucrats have been holding staff 
meetings in an attempt to find methods for conserving energy by cutting 
waste. According to a memorandum that followed one such meeting, "It is 
estimated that 20 per cent (of the fuel consumed) can be saved if car­
buretors are properly adjusted, if cars are started more slowly, and if their 
rate of speed is such as to get the fullest possible use out of the gasoline. 
"I also wanted to ascertain whether people driving back and forth to 
work could not double up with others who use their automobiles for this 
purpose. Questionnaires have been distributed through the department 
... We may be able to improve parking conditions .. . " 
The memo came from the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes. It was 
dated June 13, 1941. 
According to Marcus Aurelius, "That which comes after ever conforms 
to that which has gone before." 
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